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This article describes and evaluates some of the
main international monetary and financial issues
discussed at UNCTAD V.t These fall under the
headings of: j) international monetary reform,
with particular emphasis on the IMF, the role
it plays within the international system, and the
conditionality it imposes on deficit countries, and
ii) the net transfer of official resources, stressing
the proposal for a 'massive transfer of resources'
approved at UNCTAD. However, we begin by
discussing some issues and problems raised by
the massive growth of developing country
borrowing in private capital markets since 1970,
since this must be recognised as a phenomenon of
rapidly growing importance, even though it was
barely touched on at UNCTAD.
The Adjustment Process and Private Capital
Markets
During the 1970s, the world economy has seen
the emergence of large and persistent inter-
national payments imbalances. The increased
volume and price of oil traded allowed the oil-
exporting developing countries a cumulative
current account surplus of $198 bn during 1974-
78. Furthermore, several developed market-
economy countries have had a consistent balance
of payments surplus: thus, between 1974 and 1978
three countriesJapan, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Switzerland accumulated an
aggregate Current account surplus of US$86 bn.
The counterpart of these surpluses was current
account deficits in other countries; for example
non-oil-exporting developing countries ran a
combined cumulative current account deficit of
$153 bn during 1974-78.
In practice, the surplus countries are under little
pressure to change their situation. The IMF has
repeatedly been called on to intensify its 'surveil-
lance' of them, in order to increase their domestic
activity and capital outflows. But these countries
are in no way dependent on the IMF for funds;
on the contrary, this institution relies heavily on
their support and they have important voting
rights within it. It therefore has little leverage to
1 The author thanks Reg Green and the editors for their
useful comments.
impose policies on them. So the main burden of
adjustment falls on deficit countries, which find
themselves under pressure to adjust quickly.2
This introduces a deflationary bias in the world
economy as a whole, and in particular in those
developing countries which need Fund assistance
or more importantly its 'certificate of good
behaviour' for obtaining access to international
private capital markets. Largely because the IMF
concentrates its activities on individual deficit
countries, the tendency has been to recommend
adjustments through strongly restrictive pre-
scriptions, even in cases where the deficits may
largely be the counterpart of structural surpluses
elsewhere in the system.
However, in the l970s, several developing
countries have been able to maintain economic
activity or even to sustain significant growth in
the face of current account deficits, because of
their rapidly increasing access to private inter-
national loans, particularly via the Euro-currency
market.3 The rapidly growing importance of
private finance for developing countries can be
seen in Table 1. Furthermore, the vast private
financial flows over the past decade have had an
important effect in helping to maintain economic
activity in developed countries, by sustaining
demand from the Third World for their exports.
It is unfortunate that, in the UNCTAD prepa-
ratory documents,4 so little analysis is made of
the rapidly increasing role of private capital
flows to the developing countries and their
important effects on these countries. Perhaps even
more unfortunate was the paucity of proposals
put forward at the Conference in this area; the
main one presented by the Group of 77and
approved without oppositionwas a repeat of
the recommendation made in 1976 by the Joint
Ministerial Committee of the Board of Gover-
nors of the World Bank and the IMF on the
Transfer of Real Resources to Developing
Countries, to facilitate access by them to private
2 In particular the IMF has concentrated on the weak
deficit countries. When the US runs a large current
account deficit, it does not ask the ¡MF for a stand-by,
but goes to alternative sources of finance!
3 For a more detailed description of the development of the
Euro-currency market and its increasing links with thedeveloping countries, see Griffith-Jones (1979).
4 See for example UNCTAD (1979) and UNCTAD (1979a).
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Table I
I. Current account deficit
II. Long-term financing (net) of which:
Official bilateral aid of DAC countries
and oil-exporting developing countrieg
Commercial bank lending and other
private flows from DAC countries (a)
Private overseas direct investment
Multilateral institutions (b)
Socialist countries of Eastern Europe
III. Payments finance
IMF credit
changes in official reserves
(- equals increase)
IV. Short term capital, unrecorded flows
and loans and commissions
Financing of the Current Account Deficits of Non-oil-exporting Developing Countries
capital markets in developed countries, by
removing existing administrative and institutional
obstacles (see UNCTAD (1) 1979, UNCTAD
1979 and 1979a, and ¡MF Survey, 18 June 1979).
If these measures have not been implemented
since 1976 (years when the capital markets have
been flooded with excessive international liquid-
ity and access by developing countries has in
fact been made easier), it seems highly improb-
able that an UNCTAD declaration on the matter
will have much influence, particularly at a time
when the growth of international liquidity seems
to be slowing down.5
No reference is made in the UNCTAD V pro-
posals or resolutions to more recent institutional
discussions in developed countries which may in
fact significantly affect the level of private credits
to developing countries. The possibility-amply
discussed recently-of developed countries' cen-
tral banks exercising controls (i.e. fixing reserve
requirements) in the Euro-currency market
would doubtlessly affect the level and com-
position of private flows to developing countries.
The Group of 77 has not adopted a position on
this point, nor are the developing countries
participating in the discussions on the possibility
of regulation. Furthermore, these discussions on
5 See, for example, the A,nex Bank Review. 26 March 1979.
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Source: UNCTAD (1979 b), based on OECD, IMF and World Bank data.
Includes private export credits and portfolio investments.
Measured net of subscriptions, contributions, participations and repayments by non-oil-exporting developing
countries. Includes disbursements by multilateral institutions financed by oil-exporting developing countries.
the regulation of the Euro-markets by developed
country government institutions could provide
a unique opportunity for the introduction, how-
ever limited, of development criteria for the
allocation of international private capital flows;
this would modify the purely commercial basis
on which these flows are decided at present.
The general problems inherent in loans to
developing countries by multinational banks are
not sufficiently explored in UNCTAD documents.
First, in the aggregate, the very high present
level of private international credits to develop-
ing countries will not necessarily be a permanent
feature of the international monetary system; it
is mainly the result of excess supply of funds
combined with industrial economy stagnation
which reduces demand by traditional borrowers.
Should this supply fall, or demand from
industrialised country borrowers increase, deve-
loping countries, and in particular the marginal
borrowers amongst them, may be squeezed out of
the market.6 For those countries whose balance
of payments will deteriorate most, thus making
them less 'creditworthy' to the multinational
6 According to some recent analyses (see for example The
Amex Bank Review, 26 March 1979 and O'Brien 1979)
due to recent world economic developments, starting in
late 1979, developing countries will in fact face greater
difficulties in obtaining loans on the Euro-markets.
(US mn
1971 1973 1975 1977
-14,344 -12,921 -41,917 -25,904
13,298 23,261 38,559 48,796
4,509 6,674 13,086 11,206
1,581 8,309 11,578 21,443
3,099 5,831 8,178 8,426
1,712 1,807 4,597 6,850
1,397 1,640 1,160 844
-741 -7,783 2,580 -12,292
36 174 1,638 -78
-777 -7,957 842 -12,214
+1,787 -2,557 738 -10,573
banks, the net availability of external funds may
be sharply curtailed (or even become negative)
at a time when those countries need it most.7
A second fundamental problem is that access to
international private loans is clearly very unequal
for different types of developing countries.8 The
countries with higher per capita GDP, and/or
whose GDP is growing relatively fast, account
for most of the borrowing.9 Many countries
are too poor (both in income level and natural
resources) to be sufficiently 'creditworthy' to
attract significant private flows. In fact, present
trends in private lending may further increase
the disparities between groups of developing
countries. UNCTAD V did approve a recom-
mendation to study the establishment of multi-
lateral guarantees for borrowing on international
capital markets which, if implemented, could
somewhat improve access for the poorer
countries. '
A third problem of private borrowing by the
Third World is the terms and conditions attached
to these loans. Not only are they on average
less favourable than those from official sources(both in interest rate and maturity); perhaps
more important, the cost of the loan is variable,
as the interest fluctuates every three or six
months with the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate
(LIBOR). This adds an important element of
uncertainty to the developing countries' attempts
to forecast and plan their future balance of pay-
ments flows. To a great extent conditions pre-
vailing in the private capital markets must be
accepted as given by developing countries. These
countries do however have the option to borrow
less on private capital markets; this important
alternative is not discussed in the UNCTAD
documents where too much of the emphasis is on
requesting increased flows of funds to developing
countries, both private and public." Reduced
foreign private borrowing could be accompanied
either by greater reliance on the developing
countries' own resources, or on greater develop-
ment of Third World financial institutions, lead-
ing to larger transfers within the Third World.'2
T Creditworthiness' is commonly defined as the bank'sperception of the country's ability and willingness to meet
future interest and principal payments on the loan.8 This differential access by developing countries is an
Important obstacle to common positions being taken by the
Group of 77 vis-â-sis issues related to private international
lending.
9 Seven countries accounted for 70 per cent of total net debt
of non-oil.exporting developing countries to multinationalbanks in December 1977. Sources: Griffith-Jones (1979),
based on Bank for International Settlements data.
10 For details see United Nations Press Release, 4 June 1979.
and UNCTAD (1979a).
11 This is perhaps more surprising in the Arusha Programme
whose stated aim is collective self-reliance.
12 An alternative source of external funds (briefly discussed
later) would be an increase in official net transfers of funds.
Perhaps the most fundamental reason why
developing countries should seek to restrain
their borrowing from multinational banks is that
it may tend to limit the range of development
strategies open to them. To become more 'credit-
worthy', a country may adopt a style of develop-
ment in which its financial and particularly its
external solvency indicators are given such
exaggerated priority that they are achieved at the
expense of other, more important, development
objectives. Multinational banks may exert this
influence themselves; however, on the whole,
they seem to prefer reliance on the ¡MF and its
influence via the conditions it imposes.'3
The ¡MF and Its Role in the International
Financial System
Under the Bretton Woods system, the ¡MF was
entrusted, with the task of assisting members
with balance of payments problems. Even though
the facilities granted by the Fund have been
broadened and liheralised during the 1970s,'4 the
contribution of Fund lending to financing the
balance of payments deficits of developing coun-
tries has been very marginal (see Table 1).
Despite this, most developing countries with
persistent balance of payments deficits make at
least some use of Fund facilities (IMF Survey,
5 June 1978). The main reason is that the bal-
ance of payments assistance provided by the
Fund provides a 'seal of approval' on the
'soundness' of a country's economic policies,
which greatly facilitates access to credits from
private multinational banks and to official aid;
it also very often plays a crucial role in the
process of renegotiation of a country's debt,
whether to private or public sources.'5 As the
former Managing Director of the Fund clearly
stated: 'the balance of payments assistance pro-
vided by the Fund plays a crucial role in the
international credit system, principally because
of its most distinctive featurethe conditionality
attached to it' (IMF Survey, 22 May 1978).
Thus the emphasis, within the area of interna-
tional monetary reform, which was placed both
during the preparatory work for UNCTAD V
and during the Conference, on the role of the
13 For an interesting analysis of this issue and of the private
banks' initial attempt to monitor the Peruvian economy
themselves, followed by their leaving this role to the IMF,
see Stallings (1979).
t-t For a description of existing financial facilities of the
Fund, and their main characteristics, see IMF Survey, 18
September 1978, and UNCTAD (t979).
13 A very recent clear exampte of links between IMF assist-
ance, new private credits and debt renegotiations is pro-
vided by Turkey (see Financial Times. 14 July 1979).
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IMF and its conditionality, seems well justified,
despite its limited transfer of resources to the
developing countries (UNDP/UNCTAD 1979,
UNCTAD 1979). Also of great significance with-
in the area of monetary issues was the agreement
at the Conference to establish an ad hoc inter-
governmental group of experts within UNCTAD
to examine fundamental issues of international
monetary policy. Given the complexity of inter-
national monetary issues, their influence on deve-
loping countries, and the clear dominance of
developed countries in the fora which at present
discuss and decide these issues, such an ad hoc
group of experts could play a significant role
were it to provide permanent and consistent tech-
nical support to the positions of the Group of 77.
One of the IMF conditions of its balance of
payments assistance is the adoption by countries
of what the Fund calls 'proper adjustment poli-
cies' expected to lead rapidly towards restoring
balance of payments equilibrium. The UNCTAD
documents elaborated a critique of the Fund's
adjustment policies.'° One of their main criticisms
is of the Fund's almost total reliance on a
'monetarist' approach to solving balance of pay-
ments deficits. As they point out, changes in the
money supply may not be reflected proportion-
ately in changes in aggregate demand, due to
the existence of substitutes for money. More
important, when a country's imports contain a
large proportion of essentials, as often happens
in developing countries, payments imbalances will
respond only to very large changes in total spend-
ing. Thus, whilst aggregate monetary tools may
improve a country's payments situation, they
often do so only at a great cost to the economy,
both in short-term lower employment and pro-
duction, and in a long-term decline in invest-
ment, which limits future growth.'7
Alternative policies to overcome balance of pay-
ments deficits, such as restrictions on trade and
exchange, either applied exclusively or combined
with reduction of aggregate demand, are rarely
and grudgingly accepted by the Fund. Such
policies could often reduce the 'cost' of balance
of payments adjustment to the national econo-
mies. The Fund's strong position, developed
16 See UNDP/UNCTAD (1979) and UNCTAD (1979). For a
somewhat more radical recent critique, see Brett (1979).
17 The policy applied in 1975 in Chile, within the framework
of an IMF stand.by agreement, provides a goodthough
perhaps extremeexample of the 'costs' of purely
monetarist measures to improve balance of payments. In
1975. Chilean GDP (in real terms) fell by l74 per cent.
the rate of unemployment in the capital grew from 97 per
cent in December 1974 to 18-7 per cent in December 1975;
the proportion of GDP devoted to investment fell sub-
stantially below the historic trend, and has not yet
recovered.
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within the context of an international commit-
ment to trade liberalisation, has even lessjustification within the framework of the new
wave of protectionism, which seems to have
spread in the developed countries in recent
years.
The second major criticism which can be levelled
at IMF adjustment policies is that they frequently
have a negative effect on income distribution.'8
Even though the Fund claims that its recom-
mendations are neutral as regards the distribution
of the burden of adjustment, its stress on
measures such as reduction of state subsidies on
essential foodstuffs and dismantling of price
controls, accompanied by limits on wage
increases, tends to worsen the distribution of real
income and consumption. On the other hand, a
tight monetary policy, accompanied by elimina-
tion of exchange controls, tends to discriminate
in favour of large enterprises, which are able to
obtain more abundant and cheaper credit abroad.
In line with this analysis, the Group of 77
demanded in the Arusha Programme that balance
of payments support should not be used to
exercise political pressure on developing countries
and should not be dependent on acceptance by
the developing country of measures and pro-
grammes which involve social costs which hinder
its basic aims, objectives and priorities. Rather
it should be related to broader development
targets. The UNCTAD preparatory document
(UNCTAD 1979) called for 'fundamental revi-
sions in conditionality practices'. In fact, the final
resolution adopted by the Conference was very
limited. First, it stresses the necessity to apply
conditionality in 'a flexible and appropriate
manner, taking into account the domestic social
and political objectives, the economic priorities
and circumstances of the members of the IMF,
including the causes of their balance of payments
problems' (UN 1979). In its statement, the
UNC1'AD resolution repeats exactly one of the
new guidelines which the IMF's Executive Board
had issued in its very recent review of the use of
conditionality (IMF Survey, 19 March 1979).
The UNCTAD Conference 'looked forward to
the effective implementation of the Fund's
decision to increase flexibility in the application of
conditionality', and added that the approach of
the IMF should be such as 'to seek reconciliation
between a country's short-run and long-run
objectives and not be disruptive of develop-
ment, and should take into account factors attri-
-
-
18 This crucial point, though made and illustrated with case
studies in tise UNDP/UNCTAD documents, is not men-
tioned in the UNCTAD documents preparatory to tIse
Conference, nor in the Conference resolutions.
butable to external elements beyond the control
of developing countries' (UN 1979). Though this
statement goes beyond the IMF review of con-
ditionality in the general principles involved, it
does not indicate any concrete form in which
such principles could be made operational.
It is disappointing that the criticisms of IMF
policy made at UNCTAD V did not include
proposals for concrete modification of the way
in which the Fund applies its conditionality in
dealing with member countries.'9 Such concrete
proposals could have hinged, for example, on
some of the following aspects. Countries should
be free to use alternative policy instruments to
those traditionally recommended by the Fund
and still be eligible for Fund assistance. In cases
of balance of payments deficits, these could
include foreign exchange and trade controls. In
attempts to control inflation, the countries should
be free to combine administrative price control
policies with those leading to reduced aggregate
demand. The deterioration in income distribution
so often accompanying IMF conditionality clearly
contradicts international understanding that
development should be oriented towards satisfac-
tion of the basic needs of the poorest strata. A
new criterion might be added to the performance
targets of IMF stand-by agreements: during the
programme of balance of payments adjustment
and in the period after, income distribution
should, at the very least, not deteriorate. These
proposals are presented tentatively, as their impli-
cations would have to be broadly discussed.
Above all, they attempt to illustrate a need for
concrete proposals for an alternative modus
operandi to modify IMF influence on member
countries effectively. Perhaps the ad hoc high
level group of experts could play an important
role in suggesting and monitoring concrete
changes in the nature of conditionality. If the
application of conditionality is not substantially
altered, more developing countries could attempt
to follow the example of Brazil, a country which
has taken an explicit policy decision to avoid
drawing on the Fund's upper credit tranches
because of the strict conditionality attached.2°
19 This can be explained to a great extenteven if not justi.fledby the fact that UNCTAD does not have a clearjurisdiction to make concrete proposals on international
monetary reform.
20 There is a general trend towards less use of IMF
assistance in upper credit tranches. In deficit periods prior
to 1974, 58 per cent of the net purchases in the credit
tranches extended into the upper tranche; while in deficit
periods from 1974 to 1976 only 19 per cent of purchases
extended into the upper (IMF Survey, 5 June 1978). Even
though this is partly due to the greater availability of
alternative sources of balance of payments finance, an
important factor has been resistance to the stringent
conditionality attached to such drawings.
But it is not so easy for poorer 'less creditworthy'
developing countries to follow the example of
countries like Brazil and still maintain some
access to private international capital markets.
An alternative, probably more promising, way of
avoiding stringent IMF conditionality would
depend on a collective response by developing
countries. Peru has recently proposed that a
Latin American Monetary Fund be established.2'
Amongst other functions, it would finance
regionally the balance of payments deficits of its
members, thus helping to side-step the need to
accept IMF conditionality. This kind of measure
would inevitably present several problems. One
would be the need to obtain sufficient financial
resources to make such a fund operational; oil-
exporting developing countries could play a large
role here. Perhaps even more important would
be whether the 'seal of approval' granted by a
Latin American Monetary Fund would be accept-
able for obtaining credits from the private capital
markets. This problem might be overcome if the
'solvency' of developing countries, currently based
largely on their following certain economic
policies, were replaced by a set of guarantee
arrangements, for example backed by the richer
developing countries.22 Such initiatives would
undoubtedly meet with resistance from the IMF
and from many developed country governments.
Whatever the difficulties involved, they would be
extremely useful, both in themselves and as a
means of increasing Third World bargaining
power.
Net Transfer of Official Resources
As regards official development assistance (oda),
resolutions were passed at UNCTAD V asking
donor countries to raise their contribution closer
to the UN target of 0'7 per cent of GNP. The
effectiveness of such resolutions is doubtful, given
that similar ones in the past have had little
impact. In fact, the ratio of oda to GNP has
fallen since the beginning of the decade
(UNCTAD 1 979a). In similar vein, UNCTAD V
agreed on the need to increase the capital base
for the World Bank.
More innovative was the resolution calling for 'a
massive transfer of resources from developed to
21 This initiative presented by Peru in April apparently has
the support of the Governments of Bolivia, Panama.
Colombia, and Venezuela (Comercio Exterior, May 1979).
22 Private banks seem willing to lend large sums to the
smaller COMECON countries, not so much on the basis of
their economic policies and prospecls, but on the implicit
assumption that, were repayment problems to arise, theSoviet Union would back the country up. Similarbut
explicitarrangements could be attempted by developing
countries.
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developing countries'. This echoes former resolu-
tions approved by the UN General Assembly and
proposals in the Arusha Programme. The Arusha
Programme mentioned concrete figures: an
additional financial transfer in the range of $35-
$50 bn. It also compared this effort to the
Marshall Plan, stressing that as in that pro-
gramme, such an initiative could benefit both
donor and recipient countries by stimulating the
growth of the global economy.23
Perhaps more relevant to present proposals than
the Marshall Plan experience would be the
Alliance for Progress,24 the large aid programme
established by the US for Latin America during
the 1960s. Several interesting points emerge in
examining its history.25 The commitment to a
massive aid programme by the US depended
little on the insistence of Latin America as 'aid-
supplicant' (which began in the early 1950s) but
was basically determined by political develop-
ments and perceptions in the donor country. Even
though the Alliance for Progress did provide
resources for important social and productive
projects, it also generated distortions in the
economic and political developments of Latin
America. It illustrates well how large transfers
of resources tend to further the political targets
of donor countries, as well as the interests of
particular groups within them, such as the TNCs.
In the case of the Alliance, the initial aims and
rhetoric were extremely progressive; structural
and social reforms were initially considered to be
the main performance criteria for obtaining aid,
while financial management criteria appeared to
have secondary importance. In practice, financial
criteria became predominant, and were usually
measured within the framework of the IMF
performance tests. To obtain US aid, countries
had to meet stringent financial criteria, which in
several cases hindered their development efforts.
Naturally, no mechanical conclusions should be
drawn from this experience for the new propo-
sals, given the important changes in the inter-
23 Similar proposals have been put forward recently in the
developed countries, both in official and non-official circles.
However, most governments of developed countries have to
date been cautious and hesitant. For more details see Jolly's
article.
24 I thank Richard Jolly for suggesting this point.
25 For a history of the Alliance and its eflects on LatinAmerica see Griffith-Jones (1979) and bibliography in that
paper. The Alliance for Progress has been scarcely studied
in Latin America, one of lhe few exceptions being Sunkel
(1969).
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national environment and the somewhat
different aims and circumstances in which a new
programme might be set up.26 However, in
requesting and negotiating for very large trans-
fers of resources, developing countries should
be aware of related historical experiences, and
of the almost inevitable link between large
volumes of aid and increased conditionality
imposed by the donor countries on their econo-
mic and even political development. Condition-
ality is no less an issue in relation to official
development assistance than to IMF or private
capital flows.
Relatively little of value emerged from the
discussions at UNCTAD V on fundamental
reform of the international monetary system,
except to demonstrate the wide divergence
between developed and developing country
standpoints. Greater significance can be attached
to the attempt made by the Group of 77 in the
preparatory work for UNCTAD V to elaborate
a more comprehensive critique of the existing
international financial system than they had
previously attempted. It can be expected that
this important work will be continued by the
recently appointed high level group of experts
within UNCTAD.
It is essential that future proposals on inter-
national monetary reform made by the Group
of 77 should have greater influence on inter-
national financial developments. To achieve this
aim, the proposals for reform made by the
Group of 77 must be made far more concrete.
They must be accompanied by pressure for
change in the decision-making processes of
existing international financial institutions and
development of alternative financial institutions
run collectively by developing countries. The
willingness of the richer developing countries (at
present particularly the oil-exporting ones) to
maintain Third World solidarity will be crucial in
making such attempts successful, as they have
both the required political leverage and the
financial resources.
26 One of the Alliance's initial main aims was clearly
political: to support a reformist democratic alternative inLatin America so as to stop the Cuban Revolution from
spreading. The main target for the developed countries
in the proposed new programmes would be basically
economic: to boost exports to the Third World, leading
to increased output and employment in their countries.
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